Taiwan Radar

Confrontations between China and the US or other countries over Taiwan’s membership or role in international organisations can be a precursor to increased Cross-Strait tensions.

A change in the nature, location and frequency of Chinese and US military exercises near Taiwan may indicate a decrease or increase in tensions.

Leaders’ statements on the status of Taiwan may be an indicator of the current state of affairs, or may themselves increase or lessen tensions.

Presidential campaigns in both Taiwan and the US can provide an insight into whether tensions with China might increase as a result of upcoming elections. The elections themselves may also trigger Chinese actions (such as military exercises) that lead to greater tensions.

An increase in military or political interaction between the US and Taiwan indicates an increase in tensions.

Closer diplomatic coordination with, or a (potential) move towards formal recognition of, Taiwan by the US and its allies would indicate a (minor or major) escalation of tensions.

A potential Chinese attack on Taiwan would probably involve a large-scale concentration of troops and equipment in Fujian, the mainland Chinese province closest to Taiwan.

Efforts by the Chinese government to induce third countries to end diplomatic relations with Taiwan are an indicator of a continuation of the build-up of Chinese pressure on Taiwan. The efforts themselves can potentially also contribute to increased US-China tensions over influence in third countries.

A severe political crisis in China would create a high degree of uncertainty regarding China-Taiwan-US relations. The chances of China attacking Taiwan, the US attacking China, or Taiwan declaring independence should then be reassessed.

Taiwan is one among several geopolitical hotspots in the Asia Pacific/South Asia region. A military crisis relating to one of the other hotspots could start a chain of events that could fundamentally alter China-Taiwan-US relations. As a point of reference: the US first became involved in the Cross-Strait relationship when North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950.

Both the US and China would need to reassess their mutual relationship, and their position with regard to Taiwan, if war would break out between the US (as a part of NATO) and Russia. A major uncertainty in such a scenario would be whether the war in Europe would spill over into East Asia, given China’s strategic partnership with Russia and US concerns over any kind of Chinese support for Russia.

If the US government would reverse, or show signs of intending to do so, the policy that it implemented in 1979, when it switched diplomatic recognition to China and withdrew its troops from Taiwan, this would trigger an acute crisis as the Chinese government would take action to make sure that it would not lose its leverage over Taiwan’s current and future status. A Chinese military attack on Taiwan could be part of this response.

Similar to what happened in 1972 when then US President Nixon visited China, the two great powers could come to an agreement that would stabilise their mutual relationship without solving the Taiwan issue. Such a development could potentially involve all parties accepting the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

If a future Taiwanese government would either declare independence or start negotiations with China over a unification process, this would profoundly change the China-Taiwan-US relationship. It could either lead to severe destabilisation, or to greater stability of Cross-Strait relations and China-US relations.

Either the US or China could resort to military action if they believed that not doing anything would result in a radical deterioration of their own geopolitical position. A surprise attack would maximise their chances of achieving their strategic aims under such highly risky circumstances.